A2A's Fourth Quarter Rests on a Decree Its Own CEO Had Not Finished Reading
Nine-month EBITDA fell 3%, guidance settled at the low end, and the real 2027 story is a Bollette draft that landed during the board meeting
A2A.MI · Earnings Call · 2026-11-10
The Decree Nobody Could Price
A2A's nine-month print is, on its face, a shrug: adjusted EBITDA of EUR 1,673 million against EUR 1,729 million, a decline of about 3%; adjusted group net profit EUR 473 million versus EUR 550 million; net debt EUR 6,063 million and leverage at 2.8x, up from 2.4x at year-end. Guidance was "confirmed" — with the qualifier that did all the work.
the text of the decree arrived some hours ago during our Board. And so we study and we try to simulate the effect in the next hours.
That is CEO Renato Mazzoncini on the so-called Decreto Bollette, the Italian government's emergency package to cap gas prices at EUR 58.9 per megawatt hour. The mechanism is the story, because it is oddly self-defeating: the decree can only bite if Italian gas prices diverge from Germany, Slovenia, Austria and France by more than EUR 7-8/MWh — and Europe has forbidden cross-border distortion. On top of that, the compensation cost for thermal generation does not fall on taxpayers; it falls on producers selling under fixed price contracts, i.e. hydro, wind and solar. A2A is roughly 30-35% fixed price across mass market and B2B.
So the company that pays may also be the company that benefits, because suppressing cross-border flow tends to lift thermal running hours — and A2A is Italy's largest thermal producer. "From one time, we have this, let's say, this kind of tax from the other side, probably it's possible to have a positive effect on the thermal generation." Mazzoncini's own arithmetic: EUR 15/MWh maximum times 6 TWh times the fixed-price share, so "the impact is EUR 5 for 6 terawatt hours, EUR 30 million, but it's difficult really to say a number in this moment." Layer on the IRAP increase: “The impact, you can count EUR 10 million each percentage point. So 5 is EUR 50 million.” — Luca Moroni, CFO · 2026-11-10
That is a real 2027 tax bill, booked as a special item, for a company whose nine-month adjusted net profit was EUR 473 million. This is the first quarter where the regulatory risk moved from "concession renewal saga" to "an actual line item."
The Water Keeps Disappointing, and It Is Not New
What has genuinely deteriorated is the hydrology. 2026 is, per the CEO, "the second worst after '22 in the last 10 years." The CFO's guidance revision is stark: “Our projection for the end of the year is to have a production of 3.5, 3.6 terawatt. Last year, we end the year at 3.7, and the target, as you know was to reach 4 terawatt.” — Luca Moroni, CFO · 2026-11-10
That is a third consecutive year in which the hydro production assumption has been walked back. In March 2025 the CEO was still anchoring the plan on a normal year: “in our guidance we reported 4.1 terawatt hour and we started with full basin higher level than 2023 because we have half a terawatt per hour regarding the capacity of accumulation of the basins.” — Renato Mazzoncini, CEO · 2025-03-20 By August 2025, an analyst was already probing the downgrade from 4.1 to 4.0 TWh. Now the guidance language is 3.5-3.6 TWh of terawatt hours. The water did not just fail this year; it has quietly broken a ten-year statistical average that management spent years defending as a planning convention.
The cost is double-barrelled: EUR 40 million of lost hydro EBITDA, plus EUR 47 million of higher hydroelectric concession fee — now running around EUR 35/MWh, which the CEO points out leaves hydro economics at roughly EUR 103/MWh selling price less fee less about EUR 50/MWh of operating cost, i.e. near zero spread.
What saved the quarter was the integration model, and it is worth crediting honestly: higher CCGT output worth EUR 20 million, energy-management trading gains, plus electricity distribution EBITDA up 7% to EUR 413 million on regulated asset base growth from the CapEx plan (over EUR 1 billion spent in nine months, ~70% development). A EUR 56 million net EBITDA decline against a EUR 100 million-ish hydrology-plus-fee headwind is the diversification argument actually working.
What Management Stopped Promising
The quiet tell is not in the numbers. It is that A2A pushed back its capital markets plan. “we decided to postpone a little bit the presentation of the plan in order to have more visibility on 2027.” — Luca Moroni, CFO · 2026-11-10 For a company whose prior calls ritually invoke "our industrial plan" as the load-bearing wall — and whose January 2025 plan was the anchor of every 2026 bridge an analyst asked about — delaying the refresh is an admission that the regulatory fog is thicker than the model.
That fog has two names. The first is Article 78 of the financial law, a new keyword on this call, offering EUR 800 million for basin maintenance in exchange for handing 50-80% of energy to GSE. The CEO dismisses it as "absolutely zero" effect because the Ministry clarified it is voluntary — but also because dredged sediment "become immediately waste," requiring a landfill and a helicopter at 2,000 metres. The second is the fourth way, which is not new at all (a top-ten keyword for two consecutive quarters) and now looks closer, with France having found an authorisation route and all concessions converging on 2029. hydro concession and Hydro Release remain the swing factors for the entire 2030 story.
The One Clean Positive: Churn Flipped
Buried in the supply business is the only unambiguous green shoot. The churn rate — a multi-year problem, with EUR 80-90 million of retention costs in 2024 — began falling in Q3 and the customer base turned positive in October.
“we restart growing like customer base for 2 effect. The first is a reduction of churn... And this is the positive effect, that despite a churn in reduction, not only in A2A but in all the market. We had a super large acquisition in the month.” — Renato Mazzoncini, CEO · 2026-11-10
Why? Because A2A now sells 10-year PPAs to mass market, small business and — from February 2027 — VAT-registered professionals, at roughly EUR 105/MWh against a market fixed price of EUR 108-120. 150,000 mass-market PPA contracts is a genuinely differentiated product in a commoditised Italian retail market. Market EBITDA still slipped EUR 10 million to EUR 321 million, but the direction of the customer count has changed for the first time in years.
Balance Sheet: Fine, Not Comfortable
Net working capital absorbed EUR 534 million, driven by price-induced retail receivables, seasonal gas storage and the shorter payment terms to CSEA; net free cash flow was negative EUR 558 million after dividends and hybrid coupons. Leverage at 2.8x holds because the new credit metrics give room — the FFO-to-net-debt threshold steps from 24% to 20%, releasing roughly EUR 1 billion of flexibility. The average cost of debt is pinned at 2.7% despite impact of high rates, with about EUR 700 million to refinance in 2027. Hedging is 70-72% for 2027 at EUR 103/MWh, versus EUR 113 for the remainder of 2026 — a reminder that they sold forward at higher prices a year ago: “We also reached 40% for '26 at a price of EUR 113.” — Luca Moroni, Chief Financial Officer (CFO) · 2025-08-05
No price tape was served for A2A in this dataset, so the market's verdict on "guidance confirmed, at the low end" is unmeasured here — which for a EUR 8.6 billion regulated-ish utility is the honest framing. The quarter is not about the 3% EBITDA decline. It is about a company telling you, in the same breath, that it cannot yet model a law that arrived two hours before its board meeting, that it cannot yet model 2027, and that therefore it will not yet show you the plan. Whether that is prudence or the first crack in an industrial-plan narrative that has held for five years is the question the next two quarters must answer.