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Akastor: A 20% Dividend Yield Carved Out of a Melting NAV

A holdco paying out real cash while its anchor asset, HMH, quietly marks itself down by a quarter
AKAST.OL · Earnings Call · 2026-11-11

The payout is real; the value behind it is not standing still

Akastor's third quarter contains a clean contradiction. On one side, a NOK 2.50 per share cash dividend, funded by genuinely banked cash: a USD 57.4 million distribution from the NES Fircroft recapitalization received in October and USD 21.6 million from the sale of Skandi Peregrino. Chief executive Karl Kjelstad framed the total — NOK 5.65 per share, roughly NOK 1.5 billion of distributions since July last year — as proof that the strategy of "maximize value, create liquidity and return capital to shareholders" is working. Against a market capitalization around USD 339 million, that trailing payout is a striking ~20% yield. This is a liquidation vehicle wearing a dividend. On the other side sits the net asset value. Fair-value NAV ended the quarter at NOK 4.3 billion, or NOK 15.7 per share, down from NOK 4.7 billion / NOK 17.3 in Q2. CFO Øyvind Paaske was explicit about the cause: a NOK 284 million reduction in the market value of the HMH stake plus the NOK 136 million dividend paid in September. Then came the post-quarter cudgel. As Paaske put it, based on Monday's HMH close the “indicative NAV would be approximately NOK 3.3 billion or NOK 11.9 per share” — Øyvind Paaske · 2026-11-11 — a further ~24% below the reported figure, all of it from one holding.

The single-asset problem

That holding is the whole story. Akastor owns 36.2% of HMH, a separately listed deepwater equipment maker that represented NOK 2.7 billion of NAV at quarter-end, valued at a USD 17.52 close. At the current USD 10.72, Kjelstad noted, the stake is worth roughly NOK 1.6 billion — more than a billion kroner of value gone, and the easiest explanation for why the group now trades near its revised NAV with no patience discount on offer. Every other line in the portfolio is now second-order: NES Fircroft at NOK 669 million, DDW at NOK 129 million, cash and liquidity funds of NOK 397 million. The operating detail was not kind either. HMH revenue fell 21% year-on-year to USD 171 million, while adjusted EBITDA of USD 38 million held a 22% margin — resilient on mix and cost, but the top line told the truth. Order intake of USD 191 million (book-to-bill 1.1) was decent in aggregate, yet Kjelstad conceded that “some of the larger equipment and upgrade opportunities shifted to later periods” — Karl Kjelstad, CEO · 2026-11-11. That phrase, and the fresh keyword later periods, are the quarter in miniature: the pipeline exists, the timing slipped, and the market re-priced the asset that houses it. Kjelstad's read is that HMH is “trading at levels we consider are not reflecting the longer-term potential of the company” — Karl Kjelstad, CEO · 2026-11-11.

DDW: the playbook they want you to remember

To its credit, Akastor knows how to walk a distressed asset back to cash, and it wants shareholders to see the template. The DDW Offshore tale is genuinely instructive: a 50% anchor-handler venture alongside DOF, blown up in 2020 when DOF could no longer support its guarantee share, taken to full control, bank debt halved, and then vessels progressively sold into a recovering market. The final three vessels went for a combined ~USD 67 million, Skandi Peregrino for USD 21.6 million in October, and DDW has now entered a runoff phase with no operating fleet. Kjelstad called it a demonstration of "active ownership through the cycle." It is also the benchmark shareholders will now apply to the big three remaining holdings.

The share price has fallen materially since the quarter end, which has also had significant impact on the market value of Akastor's HMH holding. We are clearly not satisfied with that development, but our view of HMH underlying longer-term potential has not changed. ... we will focus rather on value than timing.

Karl Kjelstad, CEO · 2026-11-11

The hidden asset carried at zero

The most interesting asymmetry sits in AKOFS Offshore, and it is one the published NAV barely registers. Revenue utilization ran at 99% for Aker Wayfarer, 97% for AKOFS Santos and 96% for Seafarer; the fleet completed a USD 300 million refinancing and exercised the purchase option on Aker Wayfarer. Yet the equity investment is carried at exactly zero on Akastor's balance sheet — a legacy of historic losses. That zero is the option. The AKOFS Santos vessel, historically a single-digit-EBITDA contributor, is headed into the yard in Q4 before a new Petrobras contract commencing Q1 2027; Wayfarer follows in Q3. Paaske expects “EBITDA to go significantly up through the commencement of the Santos vessel” — Øyvind Paaske · 2026-11-11, with a "very much higher run rate" towards end-2027. That is the higher earnings thesis in one sentence — real, but entirely in front of the company and entirely unbooked.

What management won't promise

The tension is in the Q&A. Kjelstad will say 2027 is “an important year for progressing the realization of our remaining portfolio assets” — Karl Kjelstad, CEO · 2026-11-11, but pressed on NES Fircroft realization, Paaske demurred — not in a position to comment on any specific process. On HMH, Kjelstad reminded listeners “we are a 36.2% shareholder” — Karl Kjelstad, CEO · 2026-11-11 and that capital allocation is ultimately an HMH board decision. The message across all three names is the same: value, not timing. The keyword history sharpens the contrast. "HMH IPO" was a top gainer when the listing unlocked liquidity; this quarter it is a decliner — the story flipped from unlocking value to babysitting it. "Cash proceeds" slid the same way, consistent with a realization cycle that has largely run its course for now. In their place sit softer, deferral-flavoured phrases — longer term potential, and an indicative NAV management proactively marked down before anyone else could.

Bottom line

Akastor has become a distribution machine whose next payout is far more certain than the value it is drawing down. The DDW playbook shows the team can turn distress into cash when it controls the asset — but its largest holding is a listed, mark-to-market stake it cannot control, and HMH's slide has erased more than a dividend's worth of NAV in a few weeks. The bull case is an AKOFS carried at zero becoming real earnings in 2027, plus a patient exit from HMH at fair value. The bear case is a shrinking pie being carved out to shareholders at roughly book, quarter after quarter, while the market does the marking. Either way, the market is currently offering no discount for the waiting.