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AMG Is Buying Back 9% of Itself a Year and Calling It the Best Asset It Owns

Records across the board at $974 billion of AUM — and a keyword set that quietly stopped talking about AQR and tax-aware strategies
AMG · Earnings Call · 2026-11-09

On November 9, Affiliated Managers Group delivered what its CEO called "another quarter of record results": assets under management of $974 billion, adjusted EBITDA of $354 million (+41% year over year), a quarterly record $9.50 in economic earnings per share (+56%), and a sixth consecutive quarter of net inflows. Then Jay Horgen said something a $9.4 billion company rarely says out loud — that its own cash generation is about to swallow its equity value.

“we believe that our free cash flow over the next 5 to 7 years will approximate our entire market capitalization” — Jay Horgen, Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-09

That is not a throwaway. It is the load-bearing claim of the whole call: “That is, we will continue to invest in AMG itself.” — Jay Horgen, Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-09 Management bought back $400 million of stock in the third quarter, $775 million year-to-date, and raised full-year guidance to more than $900 million — nearly double the $500 million they were guiding toward in May. The average economic share count is down about 11% year over year and roughly 30% since the start of 2024.

What stopped being said

The more interesting signal is in the language. For four straight calls, AMG's narrative spine was a quartet of secular trends: secondary solutions in private markets, infrastructure investment, absolute return strategies and tax-aware strategies. In the June quarter extraction, absolute return sat at the very top of the company's keyword ranking, tax-aware second, secondaries third. By the December-quarter extraction, all four are simply gone from the top thirty. What replaced them is a vocabulary of self-valuation: compelling valuation, entire market cap, advantage of dislocations, plus the plumbing of the earnings model — management fee, higher fee, long duration assets.

Part of that is deliberate reframing, and part is defense. When Craig Siegenthaler of Bank of America reopened the tax-aware file — an RIA custodian capping new accounts, a second still paused, fresh noise out of the IRS and Treasury — the response was unusually sharp:

I think there was an implication that you made in that last statement, which I think I will just take issue with. We had a record private markets flow quarter here. I don't want that to get lost on anyone.

Jay Horgen, Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-09

Compare the tone with a year ago, when Horgen spent paragraphs on AQR specifically, walking through its first-mover advantage and its growth from roughly $100 billion of assets at the start of 2024 to $166 billion by September 2025. Or July 2026, when he called tax-aware “a structural mindset shift in individual investor behavior” — Jay Horgen, Chief Financial Officer · 2026-07-30. In May he had already begun shrinking it — tax-aware was under 8% of AUM and under 8% of EBITDA — and this quarter AQR is not mentioned once in the prepared remarks. The theme did not disappear from the business; it disappeared from the script. That is what a company does when its most-discussed growth engine becomes its most-discussed risk.

The margin machine, and the balance sheet funding it

The replacement argument is structural and, to be fair, well evidenced. AMG's economics have shifted from revenue-sharing to margin ownership: “more than half of our affiliates, we own margin” — Jay Horgen, Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-09, and in private markets and liquid alternatives almost exclusively so. Dava Ritchea put a number on the leverage: higher-fee alternative flows translate into EBITDA growth at roughly twice the organic growth rate, “about 2x what we're seeing in our organic flow rate” — Dava Ritchea, Chief Financial Officer · 2026-11-09. Private markets raised a record $30 billion over twelve months for 21% organic growth across eleven affiliates; liquid alternatives pulled in $22 billion in the quarter; alternatives now contribute about two-thirds of EBITDA on a run-rate basis.

The catch is what funds the buyback. Free cash flow less stock comp was $239 million in the latest reported quarter, and repurchases of $180 million equaled roughly three-quarters of that quarter's free cash flow. Meanwhile effective net cash sits at negative $2.6 billion and liabilities to assets reached 55.3%, up 6.1 points year over year. Interest coverage of 7.6x is comfortable but nothing like the 35x print of 2022. Horgen said in May he would like to run toward 2x leverage and is currently underlevered — a fair statement, but one that means the buyback has a financing tail.

Which is why Bill Katz's question — what is the utility of staying public if you don't use equity in deals and trade at a discount — is the most subversive thing asked all morning. Horgen's answer (permanence supports the independence promise, a take-private would be disruptive to affiliates and clients, the debt markets and brand matter) is coherent. It's also the answer of a company whose own capital allocation ranks its stock above its deal pipeline.

Where the tape disagrees

Here is the uncomfortable part. AMG's shares are not in a drawdown: up 7.4% over 90 days, within 4% of the October 29 high of $399.02. It bought $400 million of stock in a quarter when the stock was near record levels, and it justifies that with 8.9x price to free cash flow and 8.5x price to net income.

But the broader tape has been voting the other way on this business model. Across the last twelve months, fee related earnings as a theme has fallen roughly 22% across a basket of listed alternative managers — Carlyle, Hamilton Lane, StepStone, Blue Owl — while fee earning AUM and management-fee growth measures have similarly de-rated. AMG is making a record-margin, record-fee-related-earnings argument into a market that has spent a year paying less for fee streams at its closest comparables. The company's answer is that it is buying the de-rating rather than suffering it. That works only if the cash shows up.

Fourth-quarter guidance is the near-term test: adjusted EBITDA of $405–475 million, fee-related earnings of $335–345 million versus $325 million in the third quarter, and net performance fees of $70–130 million — with a market blend already down 2% quarter-to-date as of November 6 and, notably, private market catch-up fees assumed to be nil after $15 million of them helped the third quarter. A company guiding recurring earnings up while explicitly zeroing out the lumpy line is a company that wants the quality of its cash flow generation judged on the durable part. Fair enough. The question investors should carry into the fourth quarter is narrower than the four secular trends: does the fee-related engine keep compounding at twice the organic rate after the tax-aware tailwind stops being a tailwind — and if it doesn't, how much of the buyback was priced off a multiple that only existed because the company believed its own math.