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Cebu Pacific Is Losing Billions While Quietly Winning the Philippines

A PHP 6.9 billion quarterly net loss, 8x leverage and a May 2027 convertible — and the domestic market share still went from 55% to 64%
CEBUY · Earnings Call · 2026-11-11

The loss is the story everyone sees. The share shift is the story that matters.

Cebu Pacific reported on 11 November 2026 into the worst fuel environment any Philippine carrier has faced, and the numbers are genuinely ugly: PHP 27.7 billion of third-quarter revenue (+14% year-on-year) against PHP 1.9 billion of EBITDA, a PHP 3.3 billion operating loss, a PHP 5.2 billion pre-tax core loss, and a PHP 6.9 billion net loss once peso translation losses on dollar debt are layered in. Nine-month net loss: PHP 12.8 billion. Equity is down to PHP 6 billion against PHP 253 billion of liabilities.

And yet Mike Szucs opened with passenger traffic back in growth, load factors at 84%, and a domestic share that reached 64%. That is the tension of this call: a company being financially dismantled by an input cost it does not control, while competitively being handed the Philippine market by rivals who cannot survive that same input cost.

Fuel as a competitive weapon

The quarter's cost lines are almost absurd. Jet fuel expense rose 65% year-on-year in Q3; for the nine months, fuel costs hit PHP 39 billion, PHP 15 billion higher than last year on slightly lower volume. Average fuel ran PHP 145 per barrel versus roughly PHP 86 a year earlier. Add an 8% peso depreciation and peso depreciation alone turns an operating loss into a much larger net loss.

But Szucs reframed the pain as selection pressure:

there is no doubt that these fuel prices, whilst damaging for us are existential for others. So if they do stay up longer, then the damage to others is greater, which, of course, improves our situation all the more for when actually fuel prices do come off.

Michael Szucs, Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-11

The evidence is in the numbers he and Xander Lao put on AirAsia's shrinkage: domestic Q4 seat capacity cut 40%–50% year-on-year, a fleet that ran ~25 aircraft pre-COVID, ~15–16 post-COVID, and “today, they're probably at 9 to 10 aircraft” — Alexander Lao, President and Chief Commercial Officer · 2026-11-11. Against that, Cebu's structural cost advantage — 80% of the jet fleet now new-generation, fuel burn per seat down 8% year-on-year — does real work. Management is explicit that the share number tapers back to ~60% in Q4 as Philippine Airlines restores capacity, but the durable point is that the number-two domestic player is structurally, not cyclically, impaired.

This is not a company-unique narrative in the abstract — the fuel shock is a market-wide theme. Global keyword data across the last quarters shows high fuel costs and jet fuel prices as persistent editorial themes, and in the last 30 days a basket of fuel-exposed travel tickers (Safran, Lufthansa, United, Air France-KLM) rallied roughly 30%, which is precisely the relief valve Lao described: jet fuel falling ~20% in a week following the new congress mid-term result. Cebu is riding that wave, not creating it — but it is riding it from a position of relative strength.

The hedge they refuse to place

The single most revealing operational decision on the call is the hedge book. Q3 was 30% hedged at ~$118 per barrel. Going forward: zero.

We don't think it makes sense to lock in fuel prices at a cost that would virtually assure us of an operating loss. So I don't think that's something we are prepared to do.

Mark Julius Cezar, Chief Financial Officer · 2026-11-11

That is a defensible, even rational, stance for a cash-constrained carrier — and also a naked bet. Underpinning it is the claim that unit revenues have been repriced for a higher fuel world. In May, CFO Mark Cezar gave a hard breakeven frame: network P&L breakeven historically around $120–130 jet fuel, “Our cash flow breakeven somewhere between $145 and $150.” — Mark Julius Cezar, Chief Financial Officer · 2026-05-13 Szucs now argues that at ~$145 the company is "probably very close on a year-on basis, these sort of unit revenues at a breakeven sort of position" — i.e. the revenue side has caught up to the cost side. Forward PRASK guidance of +18%–20% for Q4 and into Q1 2027 is the proof point he needs, and it is the number to hold him to.

What changed to enable that repricing is time. In April, fares were pushed up faster than demand could absorb and volumes broke. Now higher fares (+13% average fare) are being built into booking curves months ahead, on moderated capacity growth — full-year capacity growth of ~6%, 2027 guided to 5%–7% with the fleet flat at 102 aircraft. The discipline is real: contribution margin per flight, the phrase that dominated the May call, is now a background assumption rather than an emergency test.

PHP 6 billion of equity and a May maturity

The balance sheet is where the story gets uncomfortable. Total debt of PHP 201 billion, up PHP 10 billion year-to-date; average net debt to EBITDA stretched to around 8x; PHP 18.6 billion of cash plus PHP 16 billion of fully undrawn committed local bank lines. Management's stress case — fuel above $150 for 24 months — is claimed to be survivable, and there are further levers (PDP financing with well over PHP 20 billion of balances sitting with manufacturers, sale-and-leaseback, Airbus delivery retiming).

Then there is the $250 million convertible bond due May 2027, held by Indigo Partners and IFC, with the conversion price underwater. In May, Cezar was unambiguous about the plan: “we would have to refinance it. And we think there's -- that will probably be a capital markets transaction. We would probably be eyeing some equity accounted instrument like a perpetuity.” — Mark Julius Cezar, Chief Financial Officer · 2026-05-13 Six months later, Szucs has reframed it as a negotiation with friendly holders who “are all actually very keen to be in for the very long term” — Michael Szucs, Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-11 — an extension first, contingencies second. That is a meaningful softening in posture, and one worth watching: an extension is a better outcome than a dilutive perpetual, but it also means the conversion overhang does not go away.

Separately, Trina Asuncion addressed the accumulated dividend arrears on the convertible preferred shares with a clarification that matters for anyone modelling equity: the non-declaration is a regulatory constraint on distributable retained earnings, not a liquidity event — “our inability to declare preferred dividends is not a cash nor a liquidity issue” — Trina Asuncion, Vice President for Investor Relations · 2026-11-11 — and management does not intend to borrow to fund it.

What came back after being dropped

The most interesting silence-then-noise is wet lease. In May, Lao shut the door: “in terms of the wet lease agreements in the third quarter, I guess, given the current environment, that's probably not going to happen in this environment.” — Alexander Lao, President and Chief Commercial Officer · 2026-05-13 On this call, wet leasing is back as a structural margin lever — aircraft deployed to other airlines during the Philippine lean season, with commitments targeted for Q1 2027. It is a small line item that signals something larger: management is increasingly comfortable renting out assets it cannot profitably fly itself.

The other recurring thread is the Pratt & Whitney GTF grounding. Nine aircraft on ground today, expected to average 6–7 next year, with Cezar calling the engine maker's end-2027 zero-grounding target "rather optimistic" and pointing a couple of years beyond it — consistent with Szucs's 2028 framing a year ago. That constraint is why refining capacity-driven cost inflation is compounded by an inability to grow into the recovery.

A genuinely new item, barely interrogated: the franchise renewal has cleared the lower house and sits in the Senate, with terms largely unchanged except the length — now 50 years. For a company whose equity is PHP 6 billion after a year like this, a half-century operating franchise is the cheapest option value on the call.

The verdict

Cebu Pacific is not asking investors to believe fuel normalises. It is asking them to believe that a 60%+ domestic share, a structurally younger fleet and an impaired competitor are worth more than a single loss-making year. The 2027 recovery is explicitly conditional, the company will lose money in 2026, and the hedge book is empty by choice. But the market position gains are real, priced in passenger numbers rather than narrative, and management's cash preservation discipline has so far held. The bull case is that this is the year the Philippine duopoly became a duopoly of two; the bear case is that a micro-cap airline with 8x leverage is one bad hedging decision — or one bad quarter of fuel — away from a very different conversation.