Commercial Metals: A Record Year the Tape Refuses to Price
Precast stumbles, TAG compounds, and CMC pulls forward a $700M buyback while the stock sits 21% off its high
CMC · Earnings Call · 2026-10-15
A defining year the market refuses to believe
Peter Matt opened CMC's fiscal Q4 call with an unusual framing: “fiscal 2026 was a defining year for CMC” — Peter R. Matt, President and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-10-15, a year in which core EBITDA climbed to roughly $1.4 billion from $837 million and core EBITDA margin expanded 380 basis points to 14.5%. The fourth quarter alone delivered about $394 million of core EBITDA, up 35.1% year over year. Metal margin rose $42 per ton sequentially to $652 Metal margin, and the North American Steel Group's adjusted EBITDA advanced 25.2% sequentially to $317 million. Full-year Total Revenue and Operating Income both confirm a genuine earnings inflection. The tape tells a different story. CMC closed October 15 more than 21% below its February 2026 peak, and the trailing 90 trading days are a clean 11.8% decline. So the question of this report is not whether CMC executed — it did — but why a company posting record profitability, deleveraging ahead of schedule, and accelerating buybacks is being sold.The Precast stumble nobody scripted
The answer starts in the Construction Solutions Group. Precast generated $57.1 million of adjusted EBITDA in the quarter — roughly $20 million short of what management had intimated on the June call. The culprit was residential softness in certain Southeastern markets, where lower volumes burned a disproportionate share of earnings because the Foley and CP&P portfolios carry very different margins and integration is still mid-flight. That is a company-specific wound, not a sector boilerplate one.What makes it a story is the contrast with the prior call, where the same team insisted “we are very confident we can reach the goal” — Peter R. Matt, President and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-06-25 on Precast. The Precast business is now the single swing factor between CMC's execution narrative and its muted multiple. Management's defense — that residential is running at 50%–60% of a normal environment, that nonres and infrastructure backfilled the backlog, that bookings rose 12.6% sequentially and pricing keeps rising — is credible, and Peter Matt repeats the $240–250 million annual run-rate target, calling it “a good target for this year” — Peter R. Matt, President and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-10-15. But a quarter of "not how we would have written the script" is exactly the kind of thing a market prices first and asks questions later.So, it is very disappointing. it is kind of not how we would have written the script. What I want to be categorically clear about is that we are not overly concerned... Our margins in spite of that volume loss remained at 30%.
TAG escalates, and a buyback promise is cashed
Against that stumble sits an escalation on the cost side. The TAG initiative — CMC's operational and commercial excellence program — exited fiscal 26 with more than $250 million of gross run-rate benefits and, management now says, a clear line of sight on an additional $100 million by the end of fiscal 2027. On prior calls the run-rate figure was framed closer to $150 million; the program has quietly become a durable source of margin expansion rather than a one-time lift. The bigger capital-markets event is the buyback. Having cut net leverage to 1.9x — inside its stated 2x target — and with capital spending set to fall roughly $200 million to about $400 million in fiscal 2027, management is pulling forward a repurchase plan it had only a year ago deliberately slowed.That is a striking reversal of the October 2025 language, when the same CFO-and-CEO pair promised “we will slow down our share repurchase program and bring it to a level where we're offsetting employee share grants... as our balance sheet comes into line” — Peter Matt, President and Chief Executive Officer · 2025-10-16. The balance sheet has come into line. The Effective Net Cash position flipped to a large net-debt figure after the acquisitions, and Liabilities to Assets jumped alongside it — which is precisely why an accelerated repurchase matters: it is management's loudest available signal that the deleveraging story is done.We increased it by $600 million, but to get to about a $700 million total authorization. We said we intended to do that over 3 years. What we are saying today is that we are going to pull that forward... I think you should expect a meaningful increase in the amount of shares that we are buying.