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DTI Swaps Its Buyback for the Other Hemisphere

A $50 million microcap paused repurchases, trimmed its free-cash-flow guide and doubled its tool fleet — betting that owning both sides of the global rig count beats owning more of its own cheap stock.
DTI · Earnings Call · 2026-11-06

DTI Swaps Its Buyback for the Other Hemisphere

A quarter that quietly caught up

Drilling Tools International's third quarter was not a blowout, but it was the first one in a while where the direction of travel matched the story. Revenue of $40.6 million rose roughly 7% sequentially and 5% year-over-year; adjusted EBITDA of $9.5 million climbed 14% off the second quarter with margins back near 23%, and tool rental gross margin recovered to about 77%. September was the strongest month of the quarter and the first month of 2026 to print roughly $4 million of adjusted EBITDA. The rig count did the heavy lifting: the average U.S. count rose more than 6% sequentially to 589 rigs and pushed past 600 in October for the first time in more than two years, while Canada rebounded more than 40% off the seasonal breakup. But the number is not the news. The language is. For four consecutive quarters, this company's keyword set was defined by pricing pressure, margin compression, rig count decline and cost cutting. None of those appear in the current top-30. What replaced them is firmer commercial terms — and Wayne Prejean was explicit about the regime change: “we're seeing some relief of the price compression that existed in prior quarters, considerably, because supply and demand is tightening.” — R. Prejean, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-06 That is a very different sentence from the one he used in May, when he described the company as trying to be “the price maker instead of the price taker” — R. Prejean, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-05-08 amid soft North American conditions. Two quarters can be a trend or a blip; for a rental-tool business, the direction of commercial terms is the whole margin story. The same reversal shows up in the seasonality question. In November 2025, management expected a normal year-end budget-exhaustion fade: “it feels like it's still a month away from someone having budget exhaustion and thinking they're going to drop a number of rigs.” — R. Prejean, Chief Executive Officer · 2025-11-07 This year: “that's not the case this year. We're seeing somewhat of an acceleration in activity taking shape in the second half... I do not believe we're going to see deceleration in the last quarter.” — R. Prejean, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-06

The deal that rebalances the map

The Saltire acquisition is the reason this is not a routine quarter. Roughly $80 million in cash plus 17.4 million shares — with the Loggie family taking about 30% of the combined company — buys $50.4 million of run-rate revenue and $22.5 million of run-rate adjusted EBITDA at 5.5x, a 45% margin business. The strategic effect is a step-change in Eastern Hemisphere business, which management has deliberately grown from about 8% of revenue in 2024 to 14% in 2025 and roughly 19% in Q3 2026; Saltire takes it to approximately 40% pro forma and lifts the rental fleet from ~63,000 tools to more than 100,000. That is the real argument. The Middle East conflict has been a persistent drag on the company's growth ambitions for over a year — the region was described as "relatively flat" again this quarter — yet the logic management now sells is that the conflict is a hedge rather than a wound: disruption keeps commodity prices up, which supports North American activity, while stabilization would let international activity accelerate, and Saltire gives it the scale to capture that. “our strategy we're deploying has us appropriately hedged for wherever the activity might rebound” — R. Prejean, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-06 is the cleanest articulation of why a company that has spent three years levered to U.S. land decided to buy its way out of that single exposure.

The bill arrives before the benefit

The awkward part is that the shareholders paying for the diversification are the same ones who watched the stock fall 46% from its September peak. Management raised full-year capital expenditure to $22 million to $23 million and cut the free-cash-flow range to $13 million to $22 million, landing near the low end: “we are also revising our full-year 2026 adjusted free cash flow range to $13 million to $22 million.” — David Johnson, Chief Financial Officer · 2026-11-06 About $4 million of that is discretionary growth investments into ClearPath offshore contracts that are already generating revenue — a defensible use of capital, and one flagged as far back as May: “we might have to invest in some more tools to get longer-term contracts, and that may... put our free cash flow forecast in the lower end of our guidance.” — R. Prejean, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-05-08 The difference is that this is now the second consecutive year the same trade-off is being made, against a backdrop where free cash flow less stock-based compensation was -$7 million in the latest reported quarter, versus a peak of just $0.5 million in 2022. Which makes the buyback decision the crux of the call. Asked directly whether repurchases would have been a better use of capital at these prices, Prejean did not flinch:

we were in the process of M&A and had to pause our share buyback activities because we were fully into developing this transaction... the limited float and amount of volume that we have, the ability to make an impact with share repurchases was, we believe, very limited.

R. Prejean, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-06
The numbers corroborate the pause — share repurchases fell to zero in the latest quarter from $0.7 million in Q1 2026 — and the stated plan is debt reduction first, buybacks later, with pro forma leverage targeted at roughly 1x within 24 months of a close expected in the first quarter of 2027.

What the tape is saying

The market has not bought the pivot yet. DTI is down 85.5% since late 2021, 31.2% over the last 90 trading days, and 46.2% from its September 4 peak of $2.66, leaving a market capitalization near $50 million against a run-rate revenue base that Saltire alone would add $50 million to. Price to revenue sits at 0.4x, down about 90% from the 2022 peak of 4.4x, while operating margin has slid to -4.9% and effective net cash stood at -$58 million. Prejean closed with the only thing a CEO in this position can say: “our stock price notwithstanding is greatly undervalued. So it's a great opportunity at this point to see growth in that area.” — R. Prejean, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-06 The honest read: DTI just made a genuinely company-unique strategic move — a nearly 2x increase in addressable rig market, a fleet above 100,000 tools, a shift from ~19% to ~40% Eastern Hemisphere revenue, and immediate accretion before synergies. It also asked shareholders to fund that transition by giving up the one capital return they had, at the moment the stock was cheapest. Both things are true. The next two quarters will decide which one the market remembers.