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EuroDry Sold Stock at NAV and Refused to Sell Its Ships

A record third quarter gave EuroDry the one thing small-caps almost never get: a chance to transact at the price management always said it was worth — on both sides of the balance sheet.
EDRY · Earnings Call · 2026-11-11

The quarter that let them trade at their own number

EuroDry's third quarter of 2026 was, on the numbers, the best print in the company's recent history. Total net revenues of $19.4 million, up 34.9% from $14.4 million a year earlier. Fleet time charter equivalent rates of $20,551 per day against $13,232. Net income attributable to controlling shareholders of $6.86 million, or $2.39 per diluted share, versus a $0.7 million loss in the third quarter of 2025. Through nine months, revenue is up 43.1% and the swing has been from a $7.45 million loss to $13.7 million of income. But the revenue line is not the story. The story is what management did with the two prices the market handed them: the price of their own equity, and the price of their own ships. They went in opposite directions on each, and did so with an internal logic that is unusually clean for a company of this size.

Forty percent of book value, sitting there

EuroDry carries its eleven vessels at roughly $157.4 million on the books. Management estimates their current market value at about $247 million — a $90 million gap that works out to a net asset value of $66 to $67 per share against a book value of about $38.9. For years that gap was a talking point on slides, not a transaction. This quarter it became one. With shares trading near NAV and at all-time highs during the period, the company reestablished its at-the-market program and raised approximately $10.7 million by issuing 163,753 shares at an average of $67.54 — essentially at stated NAV, and far above book. At the same time, the long-running repurchase program, which has bought 358,130 shares for $5.8 million since August 2022, was extended another year. The phrase accretive equity capital is brand new to this company's keyword record this quarter; it has never appeared before. That is the tell. “when we're trading significantly below NAV, it's worth buying back stock, and when we're trading above NAV, it's probably worth issuing some more stock. We've done it a few times, and as you said, we did it last month as well.” — Aristides Pittas, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-11 A sell-side analyst on the call actually congratulated them for it — a small but telling signal that the discipline of buying low and asset value selling high is rarer in shipping than it should be.

The ships they finally decided not to sell

The mirror-image decision is the one that matters more for the fleet. Three legacy Japanese-built Panamaxes — the oldest tonnage in the book — have been flagged as disposal candidates on essentially every call for a year. In February: “We haven't taken any decision yet.” — Aristides Pittas, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-02-20 In May: “we will decide later towards Q3 if we will dispose 1 of them or not.” — Aristides J. Pittas, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-05-20 This quarter the answer arrived: they are keeping them.

On our 3 elder ships, indeed, we did consider the possibility of selling one of them, but we decided to proceed and go and pass vessel survey. So that vessel will — the Blessed Luck — will go into dry dock within December. So we are keeping them because they are providing very good EBITDA at the moment.

Aristides Pittas, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-11
The dry dock bill for the three vessels is roughly $4 million, split about evenly between the fourth quarter and the first. Investors who had modelled an asset sale got a capital expenditure instead. The reasoning is unimpeachable at $20,000-a-day rates and much less comfortable at $12,000. And that is where the supply-side logic gets interesting. Roughly 12.1% of the global dry bulk fleet is over twenty years old — the natural bull case for anyone arguing that capacity will exit. But exit is conditional on pain: “When the ships are making $20,000 a day, you definitely try to avoid scrapping your ships if you can. If the market drops down to $10,000 per day, that's when you will see a lot of ships being scrapped.” — Aristides Pittas, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-11 The word scrapping spiked into this quarter's headline keywords precisely because the honest answer is that it is dormant. The old-tonnage lifeboat only launches in the bad market — the same bad market that would gut the earnings. Supply discipline here is not a gift; it is a hedge that pays out only when you no longer need it.

A guide who guided too low, and a bar that keeps moving

The most useful contrast in this report is between what management said in February and what happened. Asked about 2026, the Chairman said the average rate “could end up being similar to 2025.” — Aristides Pittas, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-02-20 Nine months later the fleet has earned $18,501 per day against $10,210 for the same stretch of 2025. That is not a small forecasting error; it is the difference between a loss-making year and a very profitable one. That matters because the chartering threshold has also moved. In August, the CFO described securing tonnage when rates were “approaching the high teens and beyond that.” — Anastasios Aslidis, Chief Financial Officer · 2026-08-06 Now: “On the chartering side, we prefer to be playing the spot market, and only if we see levels in excess of $20,000 a day, we may consider a year's charter.” — Aristides Pittas, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-11 A rising hurdle rate in a rising market is defensible — you do not lock in a number you can beat. But it also means the company's fixed-rate coverage stays thin, and the forward freight curve, as the CEO noted, is a little bit lower than current levels for 2027. The insurance premium they are declining to pay has a price.

The shipyard, not the order book, is the real governor

The order book stands at 15.7% of the existing fleet — up from a 7% low in 2021, but still low by historical standards. The reason it cannot climb much further is not demand for ships; it is capacity to build them. The third Kamsarmax ordered from Hengli Shipbuilding at roughly $37 million will not deliver until the third quarter of 2029, and the next available slots are now 2030. “if the order book continues expanding, it will expand mostly in 2030 onwards. So I don't anticipate a huge increase of the fleet within the next few years.” — Aristides Pittas, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-11 That is the real supply argument, and it is a better one than the shipyard scarcity story most investors tell. The word itself has flipped from a decliner in this company's keyword history to a gainer this quarter — the constraint has moved from the order book to the welding torch. Supporting it: Clarksons' upgrade to 2026 ton mile demand growth, from 3.7% to 4.1%, partly on longer-haul Africa to China flows. Notably, the global themes that dominated market keywords through 2025 — tariff uncertainty, Red Sea disruption, war in Iran — barely register here except as chokepoint disruptions with, in management's words, a minimal net effect.

Paying for the harvest

The caution is arithmetic. Third-quarter cash flow breakeven level was $11,984 per vessel per day — below where rates sit, comfortably. But look forward twelve months and the all-in breakeven rises to just shy of $13,000, driven by dry docking expenses of about $1,053 per vessel per day versus $132 in the third quarter. Debt stands at $105.7 million at an average margin of 1.84%, roughly 5.89% all-in, with an balloon repayment of $19 million landing in 2029. The company's answer to the buyout provision question on its joint ventures — there is none, but the right of first offer sits with EuroDry — is a reminder that not every asset on the balance sheet is fully theirs to transact. Third quarter was the peak of this cycle's harvest. The fourth and first quarters pay the yard bills. What the quarter really demonstrated is that a $113 million market-cap shipping company finally got to execute the trade it had argued for in slides for three years — issuing equity at NAV while refusing to sell ships into a secondhand market where a ten-year-old Panamax fetches $33.5 million, near the top of its range since 2017. Sell the expensive thing; build the cheap thing. That symmetry, more than the $6.86 million of net income, is the durable signal.