EVgo Gets a $2 Bid in the Same Quarter It Stopped Pretending to Grow
LS Power's take-private offer landed on a stock 91.7% below its 2021 peak — one week after management cut the build, cut G&A, and quietly conceded the throughput math it had spent a year defending.
EVGO · Earnings Call · 2026-11-09
The bid under the build
Badar Khan opened his prepared remarks on the third quarter of 2026 not with stalls or throughput but with a corporate event:A special committee of independent directors has been formed; no decisions made; no further comment. The tape had already voted. EVgo shares sat at $1.96 on 6 July; by early November they had been halved to roughly $1.18 before a nine-day, +56% rip took them to about $1.84 — still a 6% discount to the $2 bid, a normal spread for a deal that a majority holder has proposed but not signed. The valuation backdrop is the part people skip. Price-to-revenue has fallen to 1.5x from 4.4x a year ago, and price-to-gross-profit sits at 7.7x versus 31.9x twelve months prior. On a $574 million market cap, a $2 take-private is not a rescue premium; it is roughly where the stock traded in mid-July. LS Power, which controls the company, is effectively offering public shareholders the right to be bought out at a price the market had already assigned before the company's own guidance reset.Before I turn to our strategic priorities, I want to address the unsolicited nonbinding offer that LS Power, our majority shareholder, has made for the shares of EVgo that they don't currently own at $2 per share in a take-private transaction.
Core charging versus the wrapper
The quarter itself was two businesses wearing one ticker. Core charging network revenue rose 29% to $72 million — “representing our 19th consecutive quarter of double-digit year-over-year charging revenue growth” — Keefer Lehner, Chief Financial Officer · 2026-11-09 — while total revenue fell 1% to $91 million because the eXtend construction business collapsed to $16 million from $32 million. AV and ancillary revenue dropped to $3 million from $5 million. The company now tells you eXtend will be a $5–10 million-a-year business by 2028. Margins followed the mix. Charging network gross margin reached 39%, up 380 basis points, and adjusted gross margin hit 35% from 29%. Trailing-twelve-month network gross margin is 39% versus 37%, with adjusted EBITDA margin of +1% against −6%. That is genuine operating leverage. But look at the GAAP picture in the filings and the arithmetic gets harsher: gross margin of 8.9%, down 5.3 points year over year, on a quarter where total revenue of $83 million was down 16%. The gap between 35% adjusted and 9% GAAP is the story of the eXtend tail.The denominator tells the truth
The honest number in the quarter is the one the sell side drilled first. Chris Dendrinos of RBC went straight at it: “I think throughput per stall day was down.” — Christopher Dendrinos, Analyst · 2026-11-09 It was, to 283 kilowatt hours from 295, a 4% decline. EVgo's defense is that $13 of those kilowatt-hours per stall per day were OEM charging credits a year ago versus $42, so excluding credits the trend is up 7% — “if you exclude OEM credits, daily throughput per stall actually grew 7% year-over-year to 270 kilowatt hours from 253 kilowatt hours in 2025” — Keefer Lehner, Chief Financial Officer · 2026-11-09. That is a legitimate adjustment. It is also the second consecutive year they have had to make it. The fresher, genuinely new datapoint concerns connector mix. The NACS stores retrofits, 290 operational and heading to roughly 400, are running a materially higher charge rate than CCS stores: 35% higher in the quarter. NACS vehicles are now ~9% of public network throughput while NACS is nowhere near 9% of the network — demand is outrunning supply. Management argues that if NACS utilisation converges on CCS, those sites could exceed 400 kilowatt hours per stall per day. That is the single best argument in the deck for why the EVgo Superchargers arrangement with Tesla — EVgo owns, Tesla builds and operates — is worth more than the first two sites.What management stopped saying
The real change is rhetorical, and it is a reversal. In March, Khan pushed back explicitly on shareholders who wanted cost restraint:Nine months later, some sites “will go back into the funnel until a more opportune time for their development” — Badar Khan, Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-09, the build target was trimmed to 1,075–1,275 new stalls, gross capex for 2026 is about $100 million lighter than prior targets, and Adjusted G&A guidance was cut to roughly $145 million, with 2027 set at least 15% below the implied prior $173–178 million. The keyword set marks the shift: path to sustainable profitability re-enters the top-30 vocabulary, and vintage cohorts — code for slower-ramping 2025-vintage sites — appears as the excuse. Two things have quietly vanished. First, the EV sales narrative is now defensive rather than exuberant: sales bottomed in the spring, the summer driving season failed to deliver its normal pickup, and federal purchase incentives are gone. Second, and more tellingly, the autonomous-vehicle optionality that was pitched on every call since 2025 has been demoted to "episodic" — AV revenue at $3 million, and the one large 50-stall AV site may slip from late December into 2027. The keyword decliners list shows "AV partner" and "non charging revenue" among the sharpest fallers. The robotaxi upside is now a footnote, not a thesis. The balancing item is the balance sheet. Liabilities-to-assets has climbed to 68.0%, up 14.3 points year over year, against roughly $787 million of liquidity and $620 million of undrawn capacity. Free cash flow less stock comp was −$44 million in the June quarter, on $34 million of capital expenditure. The company's own defence of the cost cuts is that growth expense is about 25% of adjusted G&A, so ex-growth it is already EBITDA-positive — “without growth expenses, which are estimated around 25% of total adjusted G&A, the company is already adjusted EBITDA positive” — Badar Khan, Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-09. That is true and faintly damning: the profitable version of EVgo is a much smaller EVgo. So the $2 bid reads less like opportunism on a bad quarter and more like a controlling shareholder marking its own asset to a price the public market had already reached — a 5,530-stall network, 1.9 million accounts, a 16-year head start, and a strategy now openly dialled to "do less, better." The committee has independent advisers. The market has a 6% spread. The interesting question is not whether $2 gets done, but what it says that the moat Khan was unwilling to waste in March is now being valued at $574 million in November.We could choose to not go that fast, and we might be $20,000,000, maybe $25,000,000 better off in 2026 on adjusted EBITDA. But I think that honestly seems to be a little shortsighted. It wastes the moat that we have built.