Gemini Cut Costs 30% and Revenue Fell 19% — the Discipline Arrived, the Growth Didn't
A 92% drawdown, a credit card that turned from acquisition engine into capital constraint, and $0.8M of prediction revenue carrying the super-app story
GEMI · Earnings Call · 2026-11-13
A cheaper company that is still shrinking
Gemini is down 92.3% from its September 2025 peak of $32.52, and 41.8% over the last 90 trading days — including a 48% slide in the final four weeks into this print. The report explains why. “Total revenue was $40.9 million, down 19% year-over-year and 10% sequentially,” — Danijela Stojanovic, Interim CFO · 2026-11-13 while operating expenses fell for a third consecutive quarter to $119.9 million, down 30% year-over-year. The company has learned to spend less. It has not yet learned to grow.
The shape of the top line is the story: quarterly revenue peaked at $60 million in 2025Q4, slid to $50 million and then $45 million in 2026Q1–Q2, with the third quarter landing at $40.9 million on the call. Peak revenue was $60M; this quarter was $40.9M.
Adjusted EBITDA "improved" to a $11.6 million loss from $74 million last quarter — but management is unusually candid that a large part of that was a $25.7 million net gain on crypto assets versus a $25 million loss in Q2. That is mark-to-market, not operating leverage. Free cash flow less stock compensation was -$72 million, and GAAP operating loss was $79 million, wider than Q2's $76.9 million because revenue fell faster than costs.
The card used to be the acquisition engine. Now it's the constraint.
For a year the credit card was the pitch: an annual-fee-free ramp that pulled new users onto the exchange. Marshall Beard told investors in November: “I think for the near future, we're going to see similar growth rates for the credit card compared to the exchange.” — Marshall Beard, Chief Operating Officer · 2025-11-10 This quarter card revenue was $15.5 million, up 82% year-over-year but down 4% sequentially, receivables fell 8% to $202.2 million, and MTUs sat near 102,000 — with account growth, per the CFO, broadly flat for a few quarters. The reason is structural:
Available funding capacity as well as the corporate capital required to support receivables have in part constrained expansion.
Then the fraud tail. Charge-offs jumped to $11.5 million from $3.4 million, tied to the first-quarter fraud event whose delinquent accounts Gemini accelerated this quarter. Two quarters ago the same CFO described it this way:
$4.1 million discrete fraud event which we believe is non-recurring. We have since strengthened our fraud controls.
A textbook "non-recurring" item that recurred. In fairness, delinquency excluding identified fraud accounts was 3.4% versus 3.3% — the core book is stable — but the fraud tail was longer and costlier than advertised, and it landed on a card business now explicitly capital-constrained.
Predictions, the super app, and an acquisition budget switched off
Prediction markets are the freshest theme: revenue of roughly $0.8 million net of incentives, up 52% sequentially, powered by an in-house derivatives exchange and clearinghouse and a nonbinding letter of intent with Apex Fintech. The prediction market offering is genuinely new here and rides a real market-level wave — prediction markets have been a global earnings theme since early 2025. But $0.8 million is noise against a $40.9 million quarter, and the category carries regulatory tail risk. Tyler: “the future or success of Gemini predictions will not rise and fall on one category alone.” — Tyler Winklevoss, Co-Founder · 2026-11-13
Meanwhile Cameron reopened the super app framing that powered the IPO story. Its own momentum history is telling: the phrase spiked in late 2025 and declined hard by mid-2026. Reviving a narrative is not reviving a business.
The real tension is marketing. Sales and marketing were cut 75% year-over-year to $8.3 million, and full-year marketing guidance was lowered to 7%–10% of revenue from 10%–15%. That saved money and starved the funnel — retail volume declined sequentially:
“The larger challenge has really been attracting new traders, particularly following the substantial reduction in acquisition spending this year.” — Danijela Stojanovic, Interim CFO · 2026-11-13
That is acquisition spending as an admission rather than a boast. The CFO concedes the trade-off directly: “revenue growth has been the harder part for us, and we recognize that cost discipline needs to be paired with stronger customer acquisition and adoption.” — Danijela Stojanovic, Interim CFO · 2026-11-13 Back in March she framed it the other way: “if 2025 was the year of investment, I'd say 2026 is really the year of focus and discipline.” — Danijela Stojanovic, Interim CFO · 2026-03-24 The discipline showed up in the expense line. The revenue did not show up at all.
What the tape is actually pricing
Trading volume was $4.5 billion, up 18% sequentially but down 73% year-over-year. Exchange revenue of $13.4 million rose 7% sequentially yet sat 47% below a year ago. Roughly 26% of volume was between external customers and the affiliated market maker, which produces lower consolidated fee revenue because fees paid to the affiliate are eliminated on consolidation — volume that looks like activity but monetizes poorly. Services revenue fell 10% sequentially partly because the advisory warrant recognition period ended, taking advisory fees from $2.7 million to $0.6 million. Strip out the mechanics and the underlying franchise is small and getting smaller.
Against that, the balance sheet holds: $194.1 million of cash and cash equivalents, plus $35 million added to the Galaxy credit facility after quarter-end. Enough runway; not enough growth.
The metric set management now offers investors — “funded accounts, customer balances and net inflows, repeat usage and adoption of multiple products” — Danijela Stojanovic, Interim CFO · 2026-11-13 — is the right one, and tellingly it is no longer sign-ups or new accounts. Assets on platform rose to $13.4 billion from $8.4 billion, almost entirely on price appreciation, not deposits. That distinction is the whole investment case. Gemini has bought itself time with cost cuts; the next two quarters have to show that a leaner company can also be a growing one, or the 92% drawdown is simply the market pricing a smaller, slower business than the one that IPO'd.