G Mining's $4,000 Gold Got Eaten by Diesel — and by Fewer Ounces
The leverage that leaked
On paper this was a gold-price quarter. G Mining realized over $4,000 an ounce versus $3,290 a year earlier — a 22% tailwind — yet revenue rose only 6.8% to $172.7 million and adjusted EBITDA scraped out a 2.5% gain to $125.6 million. Net income actually fell to $99.5 million from $123.8 million, though that comparison is polluted by the Dušan tax incentive booked in the year-ago period. Strip that out and the arithmetic is still uncomfortable: a 22% realized-price gain translated into a low-single-digit EBITDA gain, which mathematically implies fewer ounces sold and a fatter cost line per ounce.
Julie Lafleur conceded the cost side plainly: higher labor, royalty and energy costs, offsetting the price. “The increase primarily reflects a higher realized gold price which reach over $4000 per ounce compared with $3290 per ounce in Q3 2025. Adjusted EBITDA increased 2.5% year-over-year” — Julie Lafleur, Chief Financial Officer · 2026-11-13. The culprits are not idiosyncratic — they are the market's. Crude averaged $100 a barrel in the quarter and diesel nearly doubled, which is precisely the theme that dominated the broader earnings tape this summer, where high fuel costs ranked among the market's top keywords and higher fuel prices kept surfacing across industrials and miners alike. G Mining is not a special case; it is a levered long on gold wearing an unhedged short on fuel.
This is no small accomplishment in the quarter where oil averaged $100 a barrel and the price of diesel almost doubled and where trade tariffs and more are all challenging supply chains and logistics globally.
Still, the operating print itself was clean: production up 22% sequentially to 45,000 ounces, AISC down 6%, a 58% all-in sustaining margin, and $80 million of free cash flow — roughly $1,880 per ounce produced. Management kept production guidance intact but nudged the expected landing spot to the midpoint. That midpoint language matters more than it looks, because it justifies AISC guidance holding despite the diesel squeeze — the fix is grade, not cost-cutting.
Oko West, and the quieter second deposit
The real content of this call was not Q3 at all; management said so itself, spending the prepared remarks on forward value drivers. Oko West sits 38.4% complete on earned value, with $555 million of the $973 million approved budget spent and 73% committed. First gold stays pegged to the second half of 2027, commercial production early 2028, and the grinding mills are on site with mechanical installation underway.
What is genuinely new is the post-G2 consolidation. With Oko-Ghanie folded into Oko Main, a 55,000-metre infill program — twelve rigs, about 80% complete — underpins an integrated resource and an updated feasibility study targeted for mid-2027. The ambition has quietly moved from 350,000 ounces a year to a plan to “add 2 million to 2.5 million tonnes per annum of processing capacity. Allowing us to get up to 500,000 ounces per year for an approximate 16-year mine life” — Louis Gignac, President and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-13. The tell that this is real rather than aspirational: the additional ball mill has already been ordered. In August the language was conditional — “we expect to place orders before the end of the year for some of those long lead items, and that's in particular another ball mill” — Ralph Profiti, Analyst · 2026-08-13 — and now it is done, with construction of the expanded plant pencilled into 2028.
The one friction point is unglamorous and worth flagging: the drill results are outrunning the lab. “I would say bottleneck or challenge that we are dealing with is more the assay, turnaround. From the, from the assay lab.” — Louis Gignac, President and Chief Executive Officer · 2026-11-13 Core observations confirm the historical G2 model is predictive, but with a substantial assay backlog, the integrated study is hostage to turnaround times. That is the difference between a mid-2027 study and a slipping one.
What management stopped saying
The most instructive comparison in this dossier is negative space. Through 2025 this company's keyword profile was dominated by poly-met liners, SAG mill, unplanned downtime, strip ratio and nameplate capacity — a ramping single-asset miner fighting its grinding circuit. Not one of those words surfaced in Q3 2026. Throughput hit 96% of nameplate, mining rates set a record at 74,200 tonnes a day, and the deferred stripping that had dogged the mine plan is being caught up.
More striking, equity dilution — a live concern in early 2025 when analysts pressed on financing the Guyana build — has vanished entirely, replaced by a normal course issuer bid that repurchased 103,000 shares at an average of $49.41. From “our original intent is to minimize equity dilution” — Louis-Pierre Gignac, Chief Executive Officer · 2025-03-28 to buying stock back in eighteen months is a full arc, and it is funded rather than borrowed: $137 million of cash, $31 million of debt, a $350 million undrawn revolver, and management's projection of a liquidity surplus north of $600 million against remaining Oko commitments.
One more reversal: in August, asked about 2027 costs, Gignac deferred, saying “we'll just take a pause and wait to see how that could potentially impact '27” — Louis-Pierre Gignac, Chief Executive Officer · 2026-08-13. This quarter he committed to a 2027 cost decline in the low-to-mid twenties percent range against expected production of 200,000–235,000 ounces ex-Oko-Ghanie. Guidance that was withheld became guidance that was volunteered.
The hedged real, and the next catalyst
The quarter's most quietly valuable decision was currency. Post-election the Brazilian real weakened 10–12%, and rather than bank the windfall on paper, management locked it: 42% of next year's exposure hedged at forward rates better than budget, against a 5.55 assumption. That is the scaffolding under the 2027 cost promise. Diesel is the residual risk — $1.30 a litre against a $1.10 budget, with management sizing each 10% move at about $5 an ounce on AISC, while power is only ~3% of costs and being recontracted at higher but manageable rates. These are exactly the cost pressure and inflationary pressures analysts probed twice, and the answers were specific rather than evasive.
Beyond Oko, Gurupi is graduating from science project to mine plan. Drilling has expanded Blanket and Mandioca, maiden holes at Grota do Ouro hit near-surface mineralization across a 5-kilometre corridor, and a resource plus Gurupi PEA land by year end alongside ESIA filing. Gignac now sizes mineable resources at a 5.8 million tonne per annum milling rate — closer to Oko Phase 1 than to a satellite pit — with permitting, not geology, as the critical path: a preliminary licence possibly late 2027, full licence in 2028, plus a resettlement action plan.
The capitalized exploration line was raised $11 million to $53–61 million to fund the Oko-Ghanie work, and the power plant is tracking ahead of schedule with all generators set. Catalysts are stacked: Q1 infill results, the integrated study mid-2027, Gurupi studies before year end. The bull case rests on grade — a full quarter of higher-grade Phase 2 ore in Q4 must deliver the cost relief the year needs. The bear case is simpler: with gold at $4,000, a 22% price move producing 2.5% EBITDA growth is a reminder that this equity is not the clean gold-price proxy its holders may believe it is.