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OPAL Fuels: a $43 Million Stub Riding a Soybean Spread

RIN policy talk vanished, the production fix keeps slipping, and the co-CEO who built the upstream is leaving — the equity is now a levered call on a crush it doesn't control
OPAL · Earnings Call · 2026-11-09

The math of a levered stub

OPAL Fuels is a $43 million market cap company carrying $440 million of non-current debt, up 228% over four years and another 33% year over year. The stock is down 85.5% since its 2021 listing, 32% in the last ninety trading days, and 45% below its August 10 high of $2.60 — with a +155% five-week spike in the middle that was fully surrendered. This is not a business being valued on earnings; it is a thin equity option written against a RIN-price-linked asset base.

The third quarter looked, on the headline, like progress: adjusted EBITDA of $26.7 million, up 32%, and $66.5 million for the nine months, up 16%. But revenue was $79.5 million versus $83.4 million a year ago — down 5% for the nine-month period — and operating income was a loss of $9 million, with net income at -$4 million. The distance between a 32%-growth EBITDA line and a negative operating line is depreciation, interest on that $440 million, and equity-method income from investments OPAL only half-owns.

What actually changed: RINs stopped being a policy trade

The most striking thing about this call is what vanished. In August, Adam Comora told investors “Set Rule 3 is what people will be focused on, over the balance of the year” — Adam J. Comora, Co-CEO · 2026-08-10, and spent multiple answers on EPA engagement, eRIN pathways, and bipartisan support in Congress. This quarter, Set Rule 3 is essentially absent. In its place is a tutorial in commodity spread mechanics.

Under Set Rule 2's conservative renewable volume obligations, the market believes D3 RIN supply is ample, so D3 has decoupled from its own mandate and pinned itself to the D4 RIN floor: “When the D3 RIN market believes we are potentially oversupplied, D3 RINs trade close and in tandem with the D4 RIN” — Adam Comora, Co-CEO · 2026-11-09. And what sets the D4? Not the RFS — the bean oil crush. As Comora put it, D4 pricing is “taking their pricing cues from the spread between diesel and bean oil, the feedstock for renewable diesel” — Adam Comora, Co-CEO · 2026-11-09.

That is the real change at this company. OPAL's realized price for its primary product is now set by a soybean-oil-to-diesel spread in a market where it operates nothing. Management points to a potential price cap of $3.50–$4 for 2027–28 and hopes for a tighter 2027, but has budgeted the year at the floor. As Kazi Hasan summarized the guide, “the 2 biggest variables are the production volume and the RIN prices” — Kazi Hasan, Chief Financial Officer · 2026-11-09 — one of which they control, and one of which they emphatically do not.

The production improvement that keeps not arriving

For at least four consecutive calls, the equity story has rested on production improvement at existing plants — squeezing incremental MMBtus out of landfills and membranes at almost no capital cost. In March, Jon Maurer called 85–86% inlet utilization “something that ought to be readily achievable” — Jonathan Gilbert Maurer, Co-CEO · 2026-03-16. In August, Comora conceded “we are not satisfied with where we are at currently in terms of the production from our existing facilities” — Adam J. Comora, Co-CEO · 2026-08-10 and Maurer promised the collection and quality rollout “across more of our fleet during the remainder of the year and into next year” — Jonathan Gilbert Maurer, Co-CEO · 2026-08-10.

Some of the projected gains did not materialize as quickly as we would have liked. However, fourth quarter production rates are now reflecting the benefits of these improvements.

Jonathan Maurer, Co-CEO · 2026-11-09

Third-quarter landfill gas production of 1.3 million MMBtu was up 5% year over year and 7% sequentially — real, but not enough: full-year production guidance was cut to below the prior range, and the EBITDA guide was pulled to the low end. The saving grace is that the spending is behind them: “most of those expenses have already been made... predominantly are behind us on a lot of those projects” — Adam Comora, Co-CEO · 2026-11-09. If Q4 rates hold, operating leverage cuts both ways in OPAL's favour for the first time in a year. Asked whether 6.5–7.0 million MMBtu was a fair 2027 mark, Comora declined to guide but offered that “double-digit EBITDA for '27 is not out of the question or unreasonable” — Adam Comora, Co-CEO · 2026-11-09.

The quiet pivot downstream — and the co-CEO exit

The strategic shift that got the least airtime is the most consequential. OPAL was sold as an upstream RNG producer; capital is now tilting toward Fuel Station Services, which grew segment EBITDA 18% to $13 million on volume and margin, increasingly from OPAL-owned stations on contracted tolling where gas, power and taxes pass through. Comora's justification is a fuel-switching pitch: “$6 diesel is not required for the financials to make sense for fleets” — Adam Comora, Co-CEO · 2026-11-09, and at $6, paybacks on natural gas tractors are measured in months. Maurer framed the runway as “natural gas representing now only a 2% share of heavy-duty trucking market” — Jonathan Maurer, Co-CEO · 2026-11-09.

Follow the capital allocation decision: “it seems to us that there'll be a higher allocation into the fuel station services piece of our business” — Adam Comora, Co-CEO · 2026-11-09. Hasan dressed it as portfolio stability — an earnings stream uncorrelated with RINs. Read plainly, OPAL is trading a volatile, high-return upstream growth engine for a steadier, lower-return, capital-hungry station network. That is a de-risking of the story, not a growth story.

And the architect of the upstream half is leaving: Jon Maurer retires as co-CEO on March 31, 2027, handing Comora sole command, with the co-CEOs structure ending after building Fortistar Methane Group into the RNG backbone. Two other quieter items: tax credit treatment for 45Z moved to government-grant accounting (offsetting cost of sales rather than the tax line — no EBITDA effect, but a gross-margin optics change), and capex remains $28 million a quarter against $122 million of total liquidity.

The verdict the tape has already reached

Against liabilities at 50% of assets, a $43 million market cap and $440 million of debt, the equity is a levered call on two things OPAL cannot control: D4/D3 RIN pricing and the soybean crush. Management's controllable lever — plant uptime — has been promised for four quarters and delivered at a 5% year-over-year rate. The new lever, downstream stations, is real but slow and lower-multiple. The stock's 32% slide into this print, on top of an 85% lifetime decline, says the market has stopped paying for adjusted EBITDA and started pricing the balance sheet. Until 2027 guidance arrives with a visible production ramp from Cottonwood, Burlington and CMS — and until the D3 RIN climbs off the D4 floor — this remains a story about a $43 million stub riding a spread it has no say in.