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StoneCo Deletes 2027 — and Points at a 250-Basis-Point Yield Curve

A quarter of 'gradual progress' produced a hard 2026 cut, withdrawn long-term targets, and a cost-of-risk promise that has now slipped three calls in a row.
STNE · Earnings Call · 2026-11-12

The Map Changed, Not Just the Year

The operating quarter was unremarkable-bad. What happened on the call was a different kind of event: StoneCo removed the destination, not merely the year. Adjusted gross profit guidance for 2026 went from BRL 6.6-7.0 billion to BRL 6.1-6.2 billion; adjusted basic EPS from BRL 10.8-11.4 to BRL 9.1-9.5. And then, more tellingly, the 2027 targets — reaffirmed in March and defended again in August — were withdrawn outright. That makes the trajectory of this guidance the story. Back in March, the plan was built on an explicit rate path: “we're assuming Selic at low 12% by the end of 2026 and high 11% for 2027. That's what's behind the guidance number.” — Diego Salgado, CFO · 2026-03-03 Even in August, with the Selic already running closer to 14%, the line held: “None of this changes our guidance ranges, as we've mentioned before” — Diego Salgado, CFO · 2026-08-13 — despite rates being a headwind of north of BRL 300 million for the year. Two quarters of holding the line, then a withdrawal. Mateus Scherer was unusually direct about the cause, and it is a macro variable dressed as a company decision:

the volatility is still very high, and the visibility is still very limited on that front... Post-election, I think we've seen a move in the yield curve of about 250 basis points. As you all know, we have a sensitivity to interest rates of about BRL 200 million-BRL 250 million for every 100 basis points.

Mateus Scherer, CEO · 2026-11-12
Do the arithmetic and roughly BRL 500-625 million of pretax earnings swung on the yield curve alone — more than the entire downward revision to 2026 gross profit. The big variable is not churn, not credit mix, not competition. It is the price of money in Brazil after an election that market participants read as fiscally worse. The tape agrees, and not just for Stone. In the global price history, the worst thirty-day cluster of decliners is Brazilian financial exposure: interest on equity down roughly 40% with CIG, BBD and RENT3.SA flagged, alongside a high income segment and private payroll loans bid down across BBD, ITUB and NU. Stone's own stock did the round-trip first: up about 25% after the first electoral round, then down about 30% when the runoff went the other way. This is a country-level repricing wearing a company ticker.

The Cost of Risk Promise That Keeps Moving

Here the tension is internal, and it has been building since May. The mid-to-high teens cost of risk has been the fixed star for three consecutive calls. In August it was stated as near-certainty:

the guidance still stands that cost of risk will trend down to that mid- to high teens in the medium term, probably ending the end of the year already at the high teens level.

Diego Salgado, CFO · 2026-08-13
By November the same CFO, Diego Salgado, has moved the horizon and reopened the model: “this trend towards lower levels will probably take a little bit longer. We are in the process of reassessing our credit models for a materially tougher macro backdrop.” — Diego Salgado, CFO · 2026-11-12 Credit model revision, not portfolio seasoning, is now the swing factor — and it flows straight through the forward-looking provision component. The underlying book still looks respectable on the surface. The portfolio reached BRL 4.1 billion, up 78% year-over-year and 9% sequentially; cost of risk eased to 20.1% from 21.5%; provisions were BRL 197 million; coverage slipped to 196% from above 200% because government-guaranteed lending, which nearly doubled quarter-over-quarter, needs less provisioning against it. That mix shift is deliberate — government programs carry guarantees that let Stone keep serving clients it would otherwise have to decline — but it also means coverage ratios and NPL optics get harder to read. The genuine stress point is the dedicated desk, where judicial recovery filings in Brazil are at record levels and larger tickets have burned the company twice. Management has capped maximum ticket size and redirected growth. The consolation is arithmetic: share of wallet in credit is still mid-single digits, and the newer credit cohorts are performing better even excluding the guaranteed lines.

The Complexity Confession

Scherer opened with an admission that would have been unthinkable two years ago, when the narrative was share gains and repricing: “late last year, we began to see higher churn in our client base. The main cause was complexity.” — Mateus Scherer, CEO · 2026-11-12 The fixes — simpler offers, more transparent pricing, sales-force incentives reweighted toward retention — are showing up in card TPV, which is still declining year-over-year on debit but improving sequentially, and in a stabilized overall market share against an Abecs backdrop of 6.6% card TPV growth. What is striking is what has fallen out of the vocabulary. Retention initiatives and client experience now sit near the top of this quarter's keyword set; price hikes, repricing waves and spread discipline — a top-three theme in the 2025 third quarter — have vanished from the list entirely. Management quietly stopped selling pricing power and started selling plumbing. The churn problem is also no longer a payments problem alone: Diego flagged that client TPV retention on credit products is running below seasonal expectations, even before it shows up in NPL formation. The result is the keyword that now defines the quarter, term results taking pressure for long-term construction. “what has been a lot tougher than what we had anticipated is around the TPV growth and the macro side.” — Mateus Scherer, CEO · 2026-11-12

What Is Left to Believe In

Strip out the macro and Stone still has a fortress-like capital position: roughly 27% capital ratio against a 17% internal hurdle, adjusted ROE of 23.5% (up almost 200 basis points annualized), and an unchanged commitment to distribute BRL 2 billion of excess capital across 2026. Buybacks slowed to just over BRL 200 million in the quarter for an unusual and genuinely new reason — the legal entity restructuring that moved holding-company capital from Cayman into Luxembourg and Switzerland before repatriating it to Brazil. The stated logic is twofold: less exposure to jurisdictions poorly perceived by Brazilian tax authorities, and a Swiss capital hub for future expansion beyond Brazil. That is a real structural change tucked inside a bad quarter, and it is the kind of detail that gets buried when EPS guidance is cut by 15%. The bull case from here is not growth; it is a shrinking share count against a credit book compounding at 78% and a churn fix that is measurable but slow, all hostage to a Brazilian economy whose rate path nobody on the call was willing to forecast twelve months out. Withdrawing 2027 is honest. It is also an admission that the 2027 plan — built on roughly 11.7% rates — was never really a company plan at all.